The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) E-Letter

1 August 2012, Vol. 5, No. 4

Greetings,

"The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) E-Letter" is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to the readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on the relations of Japan with the rest of the world and other related international affairs by the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), private membership organization in Japan for policy-oriented international exchanges.

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"GFJ Commentary" presents views of members and friends of GFJ on the relations of Japan with the rest of the world and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author's own and should not be attributed to GFJ.

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"Will the World Uyghur Congress Sink a Great Ship?"
                                     By MUTSUJI Shoji
                                     Lecturer, Yokohama City University

The 4th General Assembly of the "the World Uyghur Congress (WUC)" was held in Tokyo on May 14. With parliamentarians from various countries including Japan attending the Congress, Rabiye Qadir, a representative of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region criticized the repression against ethnic minorities in the Region by the Chinese government and emphasized that China would not be able to forge solid footing in the international community unless she should come to respect such principles as human rights and freedom. Meanwhile, while the Chinese government had tried to press the Japanese government not to convene the Congress, visas were, in the end, issued to the parties concerned including Chairperson Qadir.

This created a wide range of effects, as exemplified by that fact that the Chinese government in response virtually cancelled a summit meeting between President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Noda, claiming that their repeated requests to defend "China's core interest" had been neglected.

Along with the issue of Tibet, which is well-known among other ethnic minority issues in China, the Chinese government is quite nervous about the issue of Uighur. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, westernmost of China and adjacent to boundaries with countries in Central Asia, covers approximately one-sixth of China in terms of space. The Uighurs, having the largest population of more than 7.2 million in the region, is one of the biggest of 55 ethnic minority groups in China.

The Uighurs, inspired by their own cultural identity, had long groped for independence, even after the region was seized by the Qing Dynasty, and in 1944 declared establishment of the "East Turkestan Republic" which was then recognized by the Soviet Union. However, China, wary of extension of the Soviet influence, formally incorporated Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region into the country as its own territory in 1955, and this was tacitly approved by the Soviet Union under the international environment of the Cold War.

In Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, there has been observed periodical occurrence of riots and demonstrations by Uighurs since the beginning of the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. Along with it, Uighur-related organizations which had long been working outside the country also gained momentum. These organizations are roughly divided into two lines of activities; one adheres to such human-right-related secular norms as "right to national self-determination" and the other to Islamic doctrine with propensity to armed struggle. Both lines of activities have rapidly expanded their influence since the 1990s, but their greatest difference from those in Tibet is that their resistance is not unified.

The Chinese government regards the riots provoked within Xinjiang by Uighurs, which have been spurred since the 1990s along with the activities of those foreign-based Uighur-related organizations, as "acts of terrorism agitated by the separatists", and implements the draconian "strike hard" security campaign against them. However, now that the "war on terror" is almost over and that "Arab Spring" stormed throughout the Middle East, it is quite difficult to justify everything at least with such rhetoric. Just as Chairperson Qadir of WUC stated, there is no denying that China's argument on human rights that "a strong state is the only guarantee of individual rights and is therefore paramount" quite deviates from the global norms on human rights.

On the other hand, no matter how much criticism China receives from the outside world, it is least expected at this stage that Xinjiang should secede from China and become independent. There will arise big friction if a foreign country should, for whatever reasons, support separation and independence of a region of any one country.

Besides, Uighurs living in Xinjiang do not seem to wish for "separation and independence," either. According to an investigation conducted by H. S. Yee in Xinjiang in 2003, it was confirmed that, while Uighurs have an strong ethnic consciousness and are more dissatisfied than Chinese with economic disparities among ethnic groups caused by the open-economic policy, they take a negative attitude either toward separatist and independence movements or toward the "strike hard" campaign by the government. Notwithstanding the disparities with the Chinese, it cannot be denied that Uighurs are also beneficiaries of the policies of "reform and openness" as in job opportunity, etc.

Frequent occurrence of demonstrations and riots should be considered to be not so much their quest for "separation and independence" as manifestation of their frustration caused by their dissatisfied coexistence with the Chinese. Should it be the case, the claim for "separation and independence" would be welcomed neither by the international community nor the Uighurs in Xinjiang themselves.

From this point of view, we could understand why WUC, at its General Assembly on May 14, made no direct reference to "separation and independence," but focused on criticism to repression against the ethnic minorities by the Chinese government. Again, it is assumed that tactical consideration was made when the Tibetan government-in-exile, also in conflict with Beijing, switched its policy from "independence" to "a high degree of autonomy " so that it could gain domestic and international support more easily. Thus, it could be said that the center of gravity of the ethnic minority issues in China is shifting from "separation and independence" to "reduction of disparities among ethnic groups in terms of politics, economy, and culture."

Besides, even if the Uighurs approve that they belong to China in return for the benefit they receive, though only partially, from China's economic growth, it is clearly impossible to sustain her economic growth almost indefinitely, and thus, winning the hearts and minds of ethnic minorities by dangling "a carrot" before them would not always be a viable option. However, the Chinese government maintains a hardline stance, sheltering behind the principle of "non-interference in internal affairs." They may fear that only one concession would erupt all the ethnic minority issues in China, just as a leak will sink a great ship. This is, in other words, an issue which might uproot the basis of the Communist regime.

Therefore, while it is inconceivable that the Chinese government should revise the existing system of autonomous region in the foreseeable future, the frustration of Uighurs is expected to be increasingly exacerbated. Since her shift to a route of "reform and openness," China has realized remarkable economic growth with an unprecedented degree of pragmatism. However, that pragmatism is fatally lacking when it comes to political and social issues in particular. It should be noted that, as long as this goes on, the Communist Party and the Chinese government will gradually be caught in their own trap.

(This is the English translation of an article which originally appeared on the BBS "Giron-Hyakushutsu" of GFJ on 20 May, 2012, and was posted on "GFJ Commentary" on 26 June, 2012.)

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For more views and opinions in the backnumber of "GFJ Commentary," the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.gfj.jp/eng/commentary/backnumber.html

No.42 "Japan-ASEAN Dialogue" Should Discuss Not Only "Sea" But "Space"

by MATSUI Akira, former Ambassador of Japan to Kazakhstan
(27 April 2012)

No.41 Is the US Really Returning to East Asia?

by SAKAI Nobuhiko, Director of Japan Institute of Nationalism Studies and former Professor of the University of Tokyo
(10 February 2012)

No.40 Is It True That Nobody Could Predict the Fall of the Soviet Union?

by YAMAMOTO Yuichi, former Lecturer of university
(16 December 2011)

No.39 Government and People Together Must Address the Resolution of the Futenma Issue

by YUSHITA Hiroyuki, former Ambassador to the Philippines
(31 October 2011)

No.38 The Death of Osama bin-Laden

by Bruce MAZLISH, Professor Emeritus of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
(5 August 2011)

No.37 Is Osama Bin Laden a Criminal or a Hero?

by ITO Masanori, Company Worker and Individual Member of the Japan Forum on International Relations
(26 June 2011)

"GFJ Updates" introduces to you the latest events, announcements and/or publications of GFJ.

The Japan-U.S. Dialogue "Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International Public Goods"

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), under the co-sponsorship with Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS) and The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), will convene The Japan-U.S. Dialogue "Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International Public Goods" in Tokyo on September 12, 2012.

This dialogue will feature such eminent panelists as Prof. KAMIYA Matake of National Defense Academy of Japan and Prof. NAKANISHI Hiroshi of Kyoto University from the Japanese side, and Dr. James J. PRZYSTUP of Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University and Dr. Michael J. GREEN of Center for Strategic & International Studies from U.S. side.

For more information, please refer to; http://www.gfj.jp/jpn/dialogue/45/draft_program.pdf

The readers of GFJ E-Letter are invited to pay attention to the notice of GFJ that it will offer an "Invitation Ticket" to the first 20 applicants for participation in the Dialogue. Should you wish to attend the Dialogue, please inform us of (1) your name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, (5) e-mail address, and (6) the sessions you wish to attend by e-mail ( dialogue@gfj.jp ) by September 5. We will send an "Invitation Ticket" to the first 20 applicants by e-mail by September 7. Unless an "Invitation Ticket" is sent to you by then, please understand that you are not included in our invitation list this time. English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided at the Dialogue.

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